Pepperdine Policy Review
Volume 3

Article 4

1-1-2010

The Rise of Russia and the National Security Implications for the
United States
Matthew Saha
Pepperdine University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Saha, Matthew (2010) "The Rise of Russia and the National Security Implications for the United States,"
Pepperdine Policy Review: Vol. 3, Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol3/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Policy Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

The Rise of Russia and the National
Security Implications for the
United States
Matthew Saha *

ABSTRACT
How the United States approaches its relationship with Russia must be
an important consideration when devising the U.S.’s national security
strategy. The security implications for the U.S. are profound because
Russia’s role in the ever-growing global environment reaches many different
countries and regions of the world. This paper aims to review the U.S.’s
relationship with Russia, past and present, while recognizing how Russia’s
leadership, military, economic, and energy policies will play key roles in
that association. Additionally, this paper will focus on the options,
challenges, and threats that are present in the U.S.’s relationship with Russia,
as well as provide an analysis of Russia and how the U.S. must approach this
long-time adversary.
I. THE IRON CURTAIN
At the beginning of the Cold War, which lasted from 1945 to 1991,
Winston Churchill explained how the “Iron Curtain” hungered for power
through an expansion of its control in the region. On March 5, 1946 in a
speech titled The Sinews of Peace, which he delivered at Westminster
College in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill said:
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain
has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the
capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest
and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them
lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one
form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and,
in some cases, increasing measure of control from—from
Moscow . . . . I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What
they desire is the fruits
of war and the indefinite expansion of their
power and doctrines. 1
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After World War II, the U.S. finally found itself standing the tallest
among other global powers. The Soviet Union found itself as the second
world power and it looked to limit the U.S.’s ability to achieve additional
progress and separate itself further from the Soviets. For instance, Stalin
“sought to deter the U.S. from utilizing its military strength. He did this by
capitalizing on the Soviet lead in conventional arms and exploiting the
perception that Western Europe was vulnerable to an attack by the Red
Army. 2
Stalin’s policies helped turn the Soviet Union into an industrial and
military superpower, but ultimately wreaked havoc domestically with a high
level of human suffering. 3 When Nikita Khrushchev took over after Stalin’s
death, Khrushchev guided the Soviet Union in a different direction by
“persuading the other members of the socialist camp to adopt a ‘new course’
that relaxed the harsher features of the Stalinist system [and] sought to
improve relations in other areas of conflict as well.” 4 While Khrushchev led
the Soviet Union, he struck fear in the U.S. with the Cuban Missile Crisis,
and he approved the construction of the Berlin Wall. Additionally,
Khrushchev’s leadership played a key role in opening up the Third World to
Russia. Khrushchev saw the third world “as an arena in which the Soviets
could compete with the West with high likelihood of success, but with less
risk than would result from a direct challenge in the ‘main arena’ of the
bipolar struggle.” 5 This entry into other states in the region allowed for
increased trade and influence. Eventually, Khrushchev “voluntarily” retired
from office and Leonid Brezhnev assumed control before Mikhail
Gorbachev became the last General Secretary of the Communist Party. 6
“During the Brezhnev years, people had been constantly bombarded with the
claim that ‘life is improving,’ even while they were surrounded with
abundant evidence that the country was falling apart.” 7 The Soviet Union
was set to implode, due in part to the nuclear arms race with the U.S.,
NATO’s policy of containment, and the USSR’s own economic failings that
were crippling it internally and making life miserable for its citizens.
The Berlin Wall had become a symbol of the USSR’s oppression and its
socialist regime that fought hard to not only keep intruders out, but keep its
own citizens within the walls of the Soviet Union. The Berlin Wall came to
represent the relationship between the U.S. and the USSR: dividing two
cultures, and two philosophies, while buttressed by guard towers with
soldiers who would fire upon anyone who dared come too close. The U.S.’s
foreign policy of containment and deterrence would soon change.
II. 11/9
In his book The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman argued that while 9/11
was the day the U.S. woke up and realized how interconnected and small the
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world had become, this shift began more than a decade earlier with the fall
of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Friedman argues that the fall of
the Berlin Wall “tipped the balance of power across the world toward those
advocating democratic, consensual, free-market-oriented governance, and
away from those advocating authoritarian rule with centrally planned
economies.” 8
Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader that transitioned Russia from the
grips of the Cold War to a new type of governance and “significantly altered
the foreign policy of the USSR, in part as a response to . . . .changes in the
international environment.” 9 Gorbachev’s role after the Cold War was just
as important because the U.S. and Russia relationship “came in from the
cold [and t]he two rivals became partners.” 10
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia was not expected to play as
significant of a role on the global stage as they previously had because the
world was no longer bipolar and the U.S. stood alone as the world’s only
superpower. The U.S. did not expect future challenges or threats from the
Russians, at least, not for some time. When the Soviet Union fell, the U.S.
and its leaders were short-sighted to think that Russian leaders would not try
to challenge the U.S. once more.
After Gorbachev’s failings domestically, Boris Yeltsin became the first
president of the Russian Federation. Author Lilia Shevtsova noted that,
In foreign policy, Yeltsin continued Gorbachev’s withdrawal from
confrontation with the West, but where Gorbachev had broken the
mold of international relations, compelling the West also to seek
new policies and think in new terms, Yeltsin not only failed to find
a new global role for11 Russia, but also failed to understand new
international realities.
Boris Yeltsin’s self-appointed replacement, Vladimir Putin, significantly
changed how the U.S. dealt with Russia. While there was neither a Cuban
missile crisis, nor a nuclear arms race, the security implications changed as
Russia’s new leader became less friendly to the West than his predecessors.
Putin changed the face of the presidency both domestically and
internationally.
The former Russian intelligence agent travelled
internationally more than two dozen times in his first year as president, and a
large portion of the countries he visited were former Soviet states. 12
Part of Putin’s strategy was to counter what Russians considered U.S.
hegemony by forging new relationships through his travels and creating
strategic partnerships. Putin was the first Russian leader to visit North
Korea in nearly fifty years, and he also visited Fidel Castro in late 2000. 13
Putin’s meetings with leaders of countries who are sworn enemies of the
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U.S. should have been an indication that Russia was untrustworthy.
However, after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Putin
was the first to contact President George W. Bush to offer support. 14 By
supporting the U.S., “Russia hoped to gain some of the benefits that are
shared between allies. But there was a deeper motivation. Russia had for
years viewed itself as engaged in its own war against Islamic extremism and
thus found in the Bush administration a natural and powerful ally against a
common enemy. 15
It was acceptable for the U.S. to engage Russia when the benefits were
obvious for the U.S. Russia cooperated with the U.S. after 9/11 by sharing
intelligence information, and allowing the U.S. to enter Russian fly zones. 16
This cooperation was short-lived in part due to the Russian’s opposition to
the Iraq War. 17
The fraying of the relationship between the U.S. and Russia continued
as Russia developed relationships with countries such as Iran, and nuclear
proliferation became a prominent issue. The U.S. Russian relationship
became increasingly strained with Russia’s agreement to build nuclear plants
in Iran starting in 2010, and Iran arguing it needed “[twenty] uranium
enrichment plants to produce enough fuel for its nuclear power plants.” 18 It
is clear that Russia benefits, as long as it receives backing on the
international stage to create a balancing effect. “[Russia] is not interested in
a nuclear-armed Iran on its southern doorstep. Nor does Russia want to see
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East . . .[However,] an agreement [to
produce nuclear reactors] would be a boon to Russia’s image as a peace
broker in international politics . . .Russia also has strong economic interests
in Iran.” 19
It is clear that Russia acts in its own self-interest, and the U.S. should
use Russia’s history and actions as a road map to predict Russia’s future
endeavors and potential indiscretions. If the opportunity to work with
Russia presents itself, the U.S. should consider the partnership for any
benefits that can be provided or goals that can be accomplished. However,
just as in politics, foreign policy can make for strange bedfellows. While
Russia has not always found itself in the good graces of the U.S., the two
countries were able to work together when fighting Hitler’s Nazi Germany
and Islamic terrorists. The important lesson that must be learned is that
Russia has no desire to reside on the sidelines, and because of this, Russia
should remain a large part of the U.S.’s equation when developing a national
security strategy.
III. TODAY’S RUSSIA
Because Vladimir Putin handpicked his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, it
is difficult to assess whether Medvedev is acting independently as
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President. 20 As Prime Minister of Russia, a title Putin also held while
serving as President, Putin remains visible in government affairs both
domestically and internationally. While the transformation in Russia is
obvious, questions still remain on what to make of its current leaders and in
what direction they are guiding their country. While it appears that
Medvedev and Putin are insistent that Russia returns to some semblance of
relevance, it remains unclear how they expect to accomplish this goal, or
more specifically, how much relevance they seek. Furthermore, while
Russia may not be the next direct successor to the U.S. as the world’s
superpower, it is important to remember that Russia remains a member of
the nuclear community and can create its own deterrence on the U.S. or
other countries, as necessary. 21 In addition, “Russia has one of the largest
energy reserves and is one of the largest energy producers.” 22
While the U.S. remains the hegemonic leader in the world today, it is
clear that Russia seeks to balance out the U.S. through the United Nations
and partnerships with countries that fail to see the U.S. as an ally. Krastev
elaborated on the progression in Russia by saying, Russia also:
“decided not to cooperate with the West in taming Iran’s nuclear
ambitions or in settling the final status of Kosovo [and
t]he
country’s military budget has increased six fold since 2000. 23
Additionally, Putin’s trip to Venezuela in April 2010, which could result
in Hugo Chavez possessing nuclear capabilities, is troubling. 24 Whether
Russia is flexing its military might, or expanding its influence, the U.S.
cannot ignore these developments and must carefully consider its approach.
Because of the countries that Russia has continued to align with, it would be
best for the U.S. to consider its national security strategy towards Russia
through the eye of realist theory.
IV. REALIST THEORY AND RUSSIA
According to Kenneth Waltz’s Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,
realist theory tells us that man desires power, and he will fight for it among
others who seek the same power. 25 The vision of an anarchic world where
states constantly compete with one another must be accepted by those who
devise a national strategy for the U.S. Any analysis must consider Russia’s
history to accurately understand its tendencies. While Russia might not
challenge the U.S. in the way it did during the Cold War, it now uses alternative
avenues, such as balancing to expand its influence, either directly, or in
conjunction with other countries.
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The competition for scarce goods is reflected in the limited natural
resources available in the world, and the degree to which states are able to
maintain their advantage of access to these resources. The resources are
being sought by countries with growing economies and populations, such as
China, but also by the U.S., which consumes more oil than any other country
in the world. 26 If history teaches the U.S. anything, policymakers will
correctly assess that Russia will succeed in its quest to achieve more power
and influence in its own region and around the world. Having once been a
superpower, it should be understood that Russia is unlikely to accept
anything less than a return to its past glory.
V. RUSSIA AND CHINA
While Russia’s relations with countries such as Iran, North Korea and
Cuba draw the ire of the U.S., China is perhaps the most intriguing and
important ally for Russia. Russia has aligned itself with China in an effort to
position itself more favorably than if it took an isolationist approach to
foreign policy. Russia and China have a very storied past, which is reflected
in several treaties and alliances during and since the Cold War. The SinoSoviet alliance, which was formed during the early years of the Cold War,
but the alliance eventually turned to conflict due to treaties that China
claimed were forced onto them by the Soviets, 27 And “By [1969], each party
clearly regarded each other—and no longer the U.S.—as its primary security
threat.” 28
Today, Russia and China have once again become evolved partners, and
their relationship must be seriously considered when devising a national
security plan. On July 15, 2001, the presidents of Russia and China signed a
Treaty for Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation in Moscow,
which covered five areas of cooperation including: “Joint actions to offset a
perceived U.S. hegemonism; demarcation of the two countries’ longdisputed 4,300 km border; arms sales and technology transfers; energy and
raw materials supply; and the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia.” 29
While many analysts said there was no reason to panic that these two
countries were working together, there was “growing concern that the new
treaty between Moscow and Beijing [could] increase coordination between
the two countries against the U.S.” 30
In 2010, Russia is still using China to balance against the U.S. and while
neither could beat the U.S. militarily, there are efforts to siphon away the
U.S.’s economic power. As reported in numerous news outlets, China and
Russia have both voiced their intentions of moving away from the U.S.
dollar and creating a new global currency. 31
In addition to its alliance with China, Russia has teamed with Gulf
Arabs, Japan, and France to end dollar dealings for oil due to the precipitous
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drop in the U.S. currency. These countries want to move instead to a basket
of currencies. 32 This move presents a dangerous threat to the U.S. With the
dwindling value of the U.S. dollar, the move could seriously impact the U.S.
economy even further if oil is no longer able to be purchased by the U.S. in
its own currency. If these states move away from accepting the dollar for oil
and instead use a combination of currencies in a “basket,” the power could
shift swiftly from West to East. Russia’s motive for its relationship with
China is not only to act as a balance against the U.S., but also to enable
China’s growth by providing natural resources, such as oil. 33
Furthermore, China’s role as the number one foreign holder of U.S. debt
provides Russia with more leverage. The power and large swath of the
globe that the two countries control can continue to grow, particularly if the
U.S. economy continues to falter, or the government continues to debase its
own currency by printing more money.
The U.S. is likely to feel additional pain from the economic downturn.
It is unlikely that politicians and bureaucrats will stop the printing presses
that are increasing the amount of debt owed by the U.S. because
domestically that would mean political suicide for the politicians, and further
blame would be placed on the bureaucrats. It is more likely that the U.S.
will keep interest rates low and print additional dollars, and when the
international community sees this continuing they will cry foul. If countries
such as Russia and China team up together and lead a charge to change the
currency that is used for foreign oil, which the U.S. is dependent on, it will
significantly hurt the U.S. Unfortunately, the U.S. has itself backed into a
corner politically, and is likely to have to deal with international decisions
before making internal adjustments.
Russia’s relationship with China convolutes the U.S.’s diplomatic
measures. Instead of dealing with only Russia, the U.S. must also consider
China in every equation. In addition to China and Russia’s economic
relationship, China’s growth and Russia’s energy policy could greatly affect
the U.S., particularly if the U.S. is forced to deal with an energy crisis like it
did in 1973 and 1979. Granted, with the history that China and Russia have,
it is not implausible to think their relationship could disintegrate to the
advantage of the U.S.
VI. ENERGY AS A NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE
The U.S. is the number one consumer of oil in the world, followed by
China, which consumes less than half as much oil as the U.S. 34 Since 1973,
there have been three instances where the U.S. has dealt with an energy
crunch that has hurt the U.S. economy. The first energy crunch occurred in
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1973, when members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) enacted an oil embargo on the U.S. because of the U.S.’s
involvement with Israel during the Yom Kippur War. 35 This embargo was
followed six years later with a decrease in oil production due to the Iranian
Revolution, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power. 36
President Jimmy Carter addressed the U.S.’s national interests in the
Persian Gulf, in what later became known as the Carter Doctrine, and stated
that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. of
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force.” 37
With the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent rise in gasoline prices, the U.S. saw
oil as a critical national security issue 38
The third energy crisis the U.S. faced was during the summer of 2008
when oil hit $147.30 per barrel. 39 Already facing a slowing economy, U.S.
consumers changed both their consuming and driving habits, just as they did
during the 1970s. 40 This prolonged the pain faced by an economy that had
yet to see the collapse in the credit and financial markets. According to
some scholars, such as Michael Klare, the Carter Doctrine is primarily
responsible for the U.S.’s venture into the Middle East and involvement in
three major wars, including the current military involvement in Iraq and
Afghanistan. 41 These scholars fail to address how the U.S. would function as
a society if countries such as Russia had moved into the Middle East and
taken over oil reserves. Furthermore, while the rationale for foreign
entanglements is debatable, the fact is that the U.S. needs oil and energy to
function as a country. While efforts have been made to wean the U.S. off of
a foreign energy supply through increased domestic production and
alternatives that can be made in the U.S., foreign oil cannot be easily
replaced.
The U.S’s addiction to oil is important to Russia because it is the
eleventh largest exporter of oil to the U.S. 42 Additionally, allies of the U.S.,
such as Western Europe and other countries in the European Union, rely on
natural gas that is delivered through Russian owned pipelines. If Russia
chooses to cut off natural gas supplies, it will greatly affect Europe, so it is a
critical to ensure that Russia does not withhold natural resources from
European countries that rely on them.
Because of the scarcity and abundance of oil in certain parts of the
world, it is easy to see how oil can be a security risk for the U.S. With its
dependence on foreign countries for its energy supply, the U.S. should
continue to keep the Carter Doctrine as part of its national security strategy.
The U.S. would cease to operate effectively without oil being imported from
the Middle East and other countries, such as Venezuela, that Russia may be
able to influence into cutting off supplies to the U.S. While avoiding
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resource wars is ideal, realist theory continues to be the best way for a
country to protect itself against adverse actions by other countries.
Considering the steps that Russia has already taken against the U.S. dollar, a
decision not to use the U.S. dollar when buying and selling oil could be
crippling. Both of these decisions by Russia should be considered attempts
to sidestep the military power of the U.S., and to cripple its capabilities as a
world power.
VII. WHAT RUSSIA WANTS
The U.S. is not without blame for the deterioration of the U.S.–Russia
relationship. NATO was created to balance and isolate the Soviet Union
after World War II, and to put U.S. military bases in countries surrounding
Russia and Russia’s allies. From Russia’s perspective, the U.S. appears
expansionary when it builds a coalition with countries in Eastern Europe that
used to be inside Russia’s borders. From a Hobbesian point of view, Russia
considers the U.S. a threat to its own autonomy, and Russia will do whatever
it can to fight against any further losses.
Even though President Medvedev is currently in power, some suggest
that Prime Minister Putin is either waiting in the wings and expects to return
to power, or he is really running the show behind the scenes. 43 However,
when Medvedev gave his second state of the nation address, he surprised
most critics by calling for broad policy changes, saying Russia needed to rid
itself of government corruption, reform the election system, allow for
innovation in the financial sector, and actively look for investment of capital
from outside of Russia. 44
Before this speech, Medvedev had faced the confrontation with George,
a back-slipping Russian economy, and an incident where the Russian natural
gas pipeline company, Gazprom, cutoff several European countries from
their natural gas supplies. These actions left most thinking that Putin is still
controlling Russia. 45 If Medvedev can follow through with some of his
proposals, Russia may assist the U.S. in future endeavors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Krastev called Russia a “rising global power, but also a declining
state.” 46 He elaborated by saying:
In [ten] years’ time, Russia will not be a failed state. But neither
will it be a mature democracy. Russian foreign policy will remain
independent—one that promotes Russia’s great-power status in a
multipolar world. It will be selectively confrontational. Russia will
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remain more integrated in the world than it has
ever been in its
history, and it will remain as suspicious as ever. 47
If Krastev is right about what the U.S. can expect from Russia, then
little good can be expected from a relationship as Russia will only continue
to align with countries that find themselves pitted against the U.S. Likewise,
the U.S. should be expected to align with NATO and other Eastern European
countries, against Russia. Currently, the U.S. is unlikely to do much to deter
Russia due to its weakened economic state and Russia’s tactical alliance
with China. As the U.S.’s biggest trading partner, and the largest holder of
U.S. debt, China could prove to be more dangerous than Russia. With
regard to Russia, the U.S. must continue to be diplomatic and encourage the
changes that President Medvedev called for during his address to the
General Assembly. If the domestic changes fail to take place, the U.S.
should consider that the failure is due to Putin’s ability to influence
Medvedev, or as further proof that Medvedev is not running the country.
Putin’s actions will speak louder than Medvedev’s words if domestic reform
fails and Russia’s partnerships deepen with countries such as Iran,
Venezuela, and China.
This paper has touched on the leadership, military, economic, and
energy-related issues concerning U.S.-Russian relations since World War II.
Russia is a very complex country which the U.S. should engage, while
keeping realist theory in mind because Russia has proven itself to be
unpredictable, particularly since the fall of Soviet Russia. Krastev, who has
lower expectations for today’s version of the once-superpower said,
Russia is not simply a revisionist power-it is something potentially
more dangerous: a spoiler at large. The Kremlin’s recent actions
easily fit this threatening image. In reality, though, Russia is not a
spoiler so much as it likes to be viewed as one. Where the West
seeks to find aggressiveness48and imperial tendencies, it will find
uncertainty and vulnerability.
Krastev could be correct in his assessment, but Russia was overwhelmed
with uncertainty and vulnerability in 1991 and today, it is back at the
forefront of the international conversation. While Russia is not currently
vying for supremacy, expecting Russia to remain weak should not be a longterm assumption. In fact, Medvedev and Putin are sure to challenge any
such notion, and the U.S. must be ready to respond.
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